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PROPERTY LAW—UPENDING THE FAMILIAR TOOLS OF ESTATE 
PLANNING: EQUITY RENDERS REVOCABLE TRUSTS SUBJECT TO THE 
ARKANSAS SPOUSAL ELECTION. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, 
434 S.W.3d 877. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On May 22, 2014, the Supreme Court of Arkansas issued a decision 
that will “upend the use of familiar tools of estate planning” when it held 
that a revocable trust can be used to calculate a spousal elective share under 
certain circumstances.1 The decision, In re Estate of Thompson, grappled 
with the clashing of two fundamental policies: free alienation and spousal 
protection via the elective share. 
After Anne married Ripley Thompson in 2001, she left her career as a 
nurse because Ripley promised to provide for her.2 In 2002, Ripley created a 
trust that would come to be valued at almost $6,000,000 and designated 
Anne as a co-trustee and beneficiary.3 Ripley was the grantor and the trus-
tee, and he retained the power to revoke or amend the trust during his life-
time.4 After about seven years of marriage, the health of Ripley and Anne 
declined, and the two became somewhat estranged.5 Anne eventually filed 
for separate maintenance, and, less than a year before Ripley died, he 
amended the trust so that Anne received $100,000 outright, about 1.6% of 
the trust’s value, on the condition that she not contest its provisions.6 He also 
revoked her status as co-trustee, and he did not inform her of any of these 
changes.7 
Despite the no-contest clause, Anne filed suit after Ripley passed and 
she learned of her disinheritance; she claimed the circumstances behind her 
disinheritance amounted to fraud and her elective share should be calculated 
by including the trust assets, an approach that has never been followed in 
Arkansas.8 
 
 1. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 18, 22, 434 S.W.3d 877, 887, 889. 
 2. Id. at 2, 434 S.W.3d at 879. 
 3. Id. at 3, 13, 434 S.W.3d at 879, 884. The provisions of the trust gave the spouse 
income for life, annual withdrawal rights of $5,000 or 5% of the principal, and the right to 
invade the principal for extraordinary expenses. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 879, 884. 
 4. Id. at 4, 434 S.W.3d at 880. 
 5. Id. at 14, 434 S.W.3d at 885. 
 6. Id. at 13, 434 S.W.3d at 884. 
 7. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 14, 434 S.W.3d at 885. 
 8. Id. at 3, 434 S.W.3d at 879. 
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Arkansas agreed with Anne and, in 
doing so, set precedent.9 It invalidated Ripley’s revocable inter vivos trust 
for the narrow purpose of crediting it toward the spousal elective share due 
to a finding of fraudulent intent.10 The court articulated the fraud as an “im-
proper circumvention of the marital rights of the surviving spouse,”11 but 
knowing what this standard entails will be difficult going forward. Although 
the court highlighted several factors relied on in establishing fraudulent in-
tent, it also provided that “each case must be determined on its own facts 
and circumstances.”12  
Thompson has launched Arkansas probate law into a gray zone of un-
certainty. Before, nonprobate transfers were simply not subject to the elec-
tive share. Now, nonprobate transfers may be subject to the elective share if 
the court thinks it reasonable to do so under the totality of the circumstanc-
es. Although the Thompson court articulates an intent-based test and applies 
the holding narrowly to revocable trusts, the decision was actually made on 
the equities of the case. In these cases, “fraudulent intent” is simply a post-
hoc label assigned to an equitable outcome. The factors used are primarily 
objective, and a synthesis of case law from the jurisdictions cited in Thomp-
son sheds significant light on what sorts of circumstances may lead the court 
to a finding of fraudulent intent. 
Part II of this note will begin by discussing nonprobate transfers,13 the 
history of the spousal elective share,14 and efforts to protect against spousal 
disinheritance that occurs as a result of nonprobate transfers;15 it will end 
with a discussion of Arkansas’s approach to the problem debuted in Thomp-
son.16 Part III will provide an in-depth analysis of factors used in other juris-
dictions to determine whether a nonprobate transfer is subject to the spousal 
elective share.17 Although this section will provide some guidance, it will 
also demonstrate just how malleable the Thompson court’s intent-based 
analysis is and how unpredictable Arkansas’s estate planning realm is left as 
a result. Part III will end by offering a practical solution in the form of nup-
tial agreements,18 and Part IV will conclude the note. 
 
 9. See id. at 18, 434 S.W.3d at 887 (explaining that the court has designated an intent-
based test, but has never applied it to facts giving rise to a finding of fraud, and 
“[a]ccordingly, that is the area of law for this court to develop in this case”). 
 10. Id. at 19, 434 S.W.3d at 887. 
 11. Id. at 17, 434 S.W.3d at 886. 
 12. Id. at 12, 434 S.W.3d at 884. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 15. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 16. See infra Part II.C. 
 17. See infra Part III.A. 
 18. See infra Part III.B. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Nonprobate Transfers 
Although the probate system is indispensable, it is not a system that 
everyone needs to use, and, today, it is a system that is becoming disfavored 
relative to nonprobate transfers.19 Four main will substitutes comprise the 
nonprobate system: life insurance, pension accounts, joint accounts, and 
revocable trusts.20 Each is the functional equivalent of a will in that it re-
serves lifetime control to the owner.21 
Life insurance is the functional equivalent of a will because generally it 
is revocable until the death of the testator, and the interests of the beneficiar-
ies are nonexistent until the testator’s death.22 Pension accounts, such as 
individual retirement accounts, also pass any remaining interest to the bene-
ficiary when the owner dies.23 Although joint accounts differ from wills the-
oretically because the donee receives a present interest equal to that of the 
donor, in practice, they can be manipulated to achieve the same result be-
cause a donor need not inform a co-tenant of the assets and may treat the 
account as his or her own; so, effectively, the transfer is revocable.24 
Similarly, for revocable trusts, the type of will substitute at issue in 
Thompson, the transferor generally names himself as trustee for the benefi-
ciary but retains lifetime control and the power to revoke.25 The remainder 
interest given to the beneficiary is functionally the same as the mere expec-
tancy conveyed through a will in that it is revocable.26 Because the settlor is 
divested of all ownership at death, and because the Arkansas elective share 
statute limits a surviving spouse to property in the settlor’s probate estate 
after death, revocable trusts have not traditionally been subject to the elec-
tive share.27 Revocable trusts are widely used as the central document of an 
estate plan28 and have consistently increased in popularity; as their numbers 
 
 19. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succes-
sion, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108 (1984) (stating that the law of wills and rules of descent 
no longer govern most succession of property). 
  20. Id. at 1109. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 1110. 
 23. Id. at 1111. 
 24. Id. at 1112. 
 25. Langbein, supra note 19, at 1113. 
 26. Id. 
 27. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 9, 434 S.W.3d 877, 882 (“As noted, 
Arkansas law is well settled that the surviving spouse’s elective interest can vest only in 
property that the deceased spouse owned at the time of death.”). 
 28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: VALIDITY & EFFECT OF REVOCABLE INTER VIVOS 
TRUST § 25 (2003). Revocable trusts are authorized in every state, by either statute or com-
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have continued to increase, so has litigation over their consequences, one of 
which is spousal disinheritance.29 
B. The Spousal Elective Share 
1. The Traditional Elective Share 
The spousal elective share originated in common law dower and 
curtesy; it had the same purpose then as it has now—to protect against dis-
inheritance when one spouse predeceases another.30 At its inception, it pro-
tected only an interest in a life estate, but the elective share has expanded 
over time to afford greater protection to surviving spouses.31 Eventually, it 
expanded to give an outright interest in real property,32 and, as wealth accu-
mulation shifted from real to personal property, it expanded to include per-
sonal property.33 Today, the policy behind the spousal elective share pre-
sents the most significant limitation on the right to free alienation.34  
As the predominant method of wealth transmission shifted from pro-
bate to nonprobate transfers, many jurisdictions began recognizing that the 
traditional elective share provided inadequate protection against disinher-
itance.35 Because the elective share was calculated from the probate estate, 
people could easily disinherit their spouses by putting the majority of their 
assets into a trust, which would become irrevocable upon death of the trans-
feror.36 A variety of efforts aimed at preventing spousal disinheritance de-
veloped in response, and, today, only a minority of jurisdictions follows the 
traditional elective share approach.37 The traditional approach calculates the 
 
mon law. Isabelle V. Taylor, Creditor Rights and the Missing Link in the Arkansas Trust 
Code: Is Death Strong Enough “to Break the Chain?”, 65 ARK. L. REV. 433, 434 (2012). 
 29. Lynn Foster, The Arkansas Trust Code: Good Law for Arkansas, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REV. 191, 240 (2005). 
 30. Susan N. Gary, Marital Partnership Theory and the Elective Share: Federal Estate 
Tax Law Provides a Solution, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567, 575 (1995); Angela M. Vallario, 
Spousal Election: Suggested Equitable Reform for the Division of Property at Death, 52 
CATH. U.L. REV. 519, 526–27 (2003). 
 31. Vallario, supra note 30, at 526. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Colby T. Roe, Comment, Arkansas Marriage: A Partnership Between a Husband 
and Wife, or a Safety Net for Support?, 61 ARK. L. REV. 735, 737–38 (2009). 
 34. See id. at 737. 
 35. Vallario, supra note 30, at 521; see also RAYMOND C. O’BRIEN & MICHAEL T. 
FLANNERY, DECEDENTS’ ESTATES 430–31 (2d ed. 2011). 
 36. Gary, supra note 30, at 576. 
  37. Vallario, supra note 30, at 535. 
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elective share according to a fixed percentage of the decedent’s net estate, 
which does not include nonprobate assets such as trusts.38 
2. Augmenting the Elective Share: A Modern Trend 
Broadly speaking, efforts to protect against disinheritance took the 
form of judicial decisions to allow the elective share to reach nonprobate 
transfers in certain inequitable circumstances and statutes that expressly 
make nonprobate transfers subject to the elective share. Common law efforts 
at preventing spousal disinheritance via nonprobate transfers preceded statu-
tory attempts at achieving the same.39 Court decisions in jurisdictions at-
tempting to protect spouses revolve around control, intent, or both.40 Deci-
sions allowing the elective share to reach nonprobate transfers under cir-
cumstances where it seems equitable to do so comprise a modern trend.41 
The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) was the original source of the aug-
mented elective share in statutory form; its purposes were to prevent spousal 
disinheritance via nonprobate transfers42 and to increase predictability in 
terms of property division at death.43 Augmented elective share statutes gen-
erally accomplish this by adding to a decedent’s estate all transfers that the 
decedent made over which he maintained dominion and control during life.44 
Today, a majority of jurisdictions has implemented augmented elective 
share statutes to more adequately protect spouses against disinheritance.45 
Similarly to other minority states,46 the Arkansas General Assembly 
has declined to adopt the UPC’s augmented estate model on several occa-
 
 38. Angela Vallario & Phyllis A. Book, Shocked by Schoukroun! Elective Share Statute 
Needs to Be Fixed, MD. B.J., Sept.–Oct. 2009, at 40; Vallario, supra note 30, at 535. 
 39. Compare Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966, 968 (N.Y. 1937) (citing to other cases 
dealing with the same issue dating back to 1842, for example), with Alan Newman, Incorpo-
rating the Partnership Theory of Marriage into Elective-Share Law: The Approximation 
System of the Uniform Probate Code and the Deferred-Community-Property Alternative, 49 
EMORY L.J. 487, 487 n.1 (2000) (stating that the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) was first 
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws and the American 
Bar Association in 1969). 
 40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.1 (2003); Roe, 
supra note 33, at 755–57; J.R. Kemper, Annotation, Validity of Inter Vivos Trust Established 
by One Spouse Which Impairs the Other Spouse’s Distributive Share or Other Statutory 
Rights in Property, 39 A.L.R.3d 14 (1971). 
 41. See Langbein, supra note 19, at 1132 (“Modern practice supplies only one theory 
that can reconcile wills and will substitutes in a workable and honest manner: the rule of 
transferor’s intent.”). 
 42. Newman, supra note 39, at 496 n.38; Roe, supra note 33, at 747. 
 43. Vallario, supra note 30, at 544–45. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. E.g., Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1159 n.15 (Md. 2008). 
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sions.47 After Thompson, however, equity can still avoid the effect of a 
nonprobate transfer used to disinherit one’s spouse in Arkansas.48 
C. Arkansas Joins the Modern Trend 
Arkansas has not adopted the UPC’s concept of an augmented elective 
share statute,49 which would put the nonprobate transfers within the reach of 
the elective share, but Arkansas has adopted the Uniform Trust Code (the 
“Arkansas Trust Code”), which expressly states that it is supplemented by 
the common law of trusts and principles of equity.50 The Arkansas Trust 
Code codifies the common law rules that trusts may not be contrary to pub-
lic policy and may not be induced by fraud.51  
Though the Arkansas Trust Code was adopted as a set of default rules 
to use, subordinate largely to the settlor’s intent,52 it explicitly states that the 
“terms of a trust prevail over any provision of this chapter except the re-
quirement that the trust have a purpose that is lawful and not contrary to 
public policy and the power of a court to take such action as may be neces-
sary in the interests of justice.”53 This language carves out an exception for 
cases like Thompson to subject nonprobate transfers to the elective share. 
1. Thompson’s Foundation 
Several Arkansas cases helped lay a foundation for the court’s holding 
in Thompson, but two in particular advocated the use of an intent-based test 
in cases of spousal disinheritance. In the context of a widower with six chil-
dren who deeded land to his children just before marrying his second wife, 
West v. West provided that “if a man or woman convey away his or her 
 
 47. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 21, 434 S.W.3d 877, 889; see Foster, 
supra note 29, at 192–93, 201. 
 48. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 6, 19, 434 S.W.3d at 880, 887 (stating that “the con-
struction, interpretation, and operation of trusts are matters within the jurisdiction of the 
courts of equity” and holding “that when a settlor creates an inter vivos revocable trust with 
the intent to deprive his or her surviving spouse of marital rights to property, then the trust 
assets will be included in the settlor’s probate estate for the limited purpose of calculating the 
elective share”). 
 49. Phillip Carroll, Uniform Laws in Arkansas, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 313, 346–47 (1999). The 
bill introducing the UPC failed the Arkansas General Assembly in 1995 and again in 1997. 
Id. 
 50. Foster, supra note 29, at 192–93, 201. 
 51. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-73-404, -406 (Repl. 2012) (stating respectively that “[a] trust 
may be created only to the extent its purposes are lawful, not contrary to public policy, and 
possible to achieve” and “[a] trust is void to the extent its creation was induced by fraud, 
duress, or undue influence”). 
 52. Foster, supra note 29, at 200. 
 53. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-73-105(b)(3), -105(b)(10) (Repl. 2012). 
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property for the purpose of depriving the intended husband or wife of the 
legal rights and benefits arising from such marriage, equity will avoid such 
conveyance” and “fraud is never presumed.”54  
Later, in Richards v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., the intent-based test 
was revived in the specific context of a revocable trust.55 The settlor retained 
the power to revoke and income for life in a trust created two years prior to 
death, but the court held this was not a fraudulent scheme.56 Because the 
decedent left his spouse a life estate in his home and about $300 per month, 
and this amount was not wildly disproportionate to his total assets, the court 
did not find fraudulent intent.57 In choosing an intent-based test, the Rich-
ards court relied on decisions from Missouri, Tennessee, Illinois, and Wis-
consin.58 
Several other Arkansas cases highlighted the general idea that the elec-
tive share is an exceedingly important interest that demands substantial pro-
tection. Hamilton v. Hamilton asserted that the elective share is designed to 
strike a balance between free alienation and protecting a surviving spouse 
and confirmed that “the surviving spouse’s right to an elective share is invi-
olate” even if it disrupts the settlor’s intent.59 Estate of Dahlmann v. Estate 
of Dahlmann established that one has the right to exclude a surviving spouse 
from his or her inheritance subject to the statutory elective share, which pre-
vents injustice.60  
As important as the elective share is in Arkansas case law, it is not al-
ways paramount. Gregory v. Estate of Gregory confirmed that the right to 
an elective share is “firmly entrenched public policy.”61 However, in the 
context of an irrevocable trust in which the settlor had relinquished control 
entirely, the settlor had no right to revoke when the trust provided for his 
children and he had left a life estate in his home to the second wife.62 The 
rights of the settlor’s six children were favored despite some effect of 
spousal disinheritance.63 
 
 54. West v. West, 120 Ark. 500, 504, 179 S.W. 1017, 1018 (1915). 
 55. Richards v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 261 Ark. 890, 894, 552 S.W.2d 228, 230 
(1977) (“The important consideration is the settlor’s intent.”). 
 56. Id., 552 S.W.2d at 230. 
 57. Id. at 892, 894, 552 S.W.2d at 230–31. 
 58. Id. at 894, 552 S.W.2d at 230. 
 59. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 317 Ark. 572, 578, 879 S.W.2d 416, 419 (1994). 
 60. Estate of Dahlmann v. Estate of Dahlmann, 282 Ark. 296, 298, 668 S.W.2d 520, 521 
(1984). 
 61. Gregory v. Estate of Gregory, 315 Ark. 187, 191, 866 S.W.2d 379, 382 (1993). 
 62. Id., 866 S.W.2d at 381–82. 
 63. Id. at 188, 866 S.W.2d at 380. 
82 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
2.     In re Estate of Thompson 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas set precedent and joined the modern 
trend in Thompson by affirming the circuit court and holding that “when a 
settlor creates an inter vivos revocable trust with the intent to deprive his or 
her surviving spouse of marital rights to property, then the trust assets will 
be included in the settlor’s probate estate for the limited purpose of calculat-
ing the elective share.”64 In doing so, the high court left the circuit court’s 
factual findings regarding the settlor’s intent to deprive undisturbed.65 Be-
cause the rule adopted in Thompson requires a very fact-oriented analysis, 
these facts are important.66 
a. The facts 
The appellee-widow, Anne, was married to the settlor-decedent, Rip-
ley, from July 15, 2001 until his death on February 20, 2010.67 Their almost 
nine years of marriage produced no children, and Ripley had no children 
from a previous marriage.68 According to Anne, she quit her successful ca-
reer as a nurse at her husband’s request because he promised to provide for 
her.69 
In 2002, after about one year of marriage, Ripley created the H. Ripley 
Thompson Revocable Trust to which he transferred substantial assets, and 
he, as grantor and trustee, retained the power to amend or revoke the trust 
during his lifetime.70 Subsequent to its creation, Ripley would amend his 
trust twice, once in 2004 and again in 2009, less than one year before his 
death.71 The 2004 trust amendment provided Anne with the right to invade 
the principal for extraordinary expenses, the right to annual withdrawals of 
$5,000 or 5% of its net fair-market value of the principal on the date of 
withdrawal, and income for life from the trust’s net income.72 The 2009 
trust, however, significantly curtailed Anne’s assets and status: it limited her 
 
 64. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 19, 434 S.W.3d 877, 887. 
 65. Id. at 1, 15, 434 S.W.3d at 878, 885 (stating that the circuit court’s findings were not 
clearly erroneous). 
 66. Id. at 12, 434 S.W.3d at 884 (asserting that “the settlor’s intent should be evaluated 
on a case-by-case basis considering all relevant facts and circumstances”). 
 67. Id. at 2, 434 S.W.3d at 879. 
 68. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 879. 
 69. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 879. 
 70. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 4, 434 S.W.3d at 879–80 (explaining that the settlor 
signed a bill of sale transferring investment accounts and stocks including 409.09 shares of 
his family-owned business common stock from his own name to the trust, indicating that he 
owned the stock). 
 71. Id. at 2, 14, 434 S.W.3d at 879, 885. 
 72. Id. at 13, 434 S.W.3d at 884. 
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to an amount of $100,000, conditional upon her not contesting the trust, and 
revoked her status as co-trustee entirely, naming instead Ripley’s nephew, 
the appellant.73 Compared to Ripley’s trust valued at $6,000,000, the circuit 
court found that $100,000 “falls woefully short of providing for his wife 
upon his death.”74 
The circuit court found that the husband’s intent to deprive his wife of 
her marital rights arose sometime in 2008 when they separated.75 Anne and 
Ripley discontinued living together in 2008 as a result of a mold infestation 
in their home; Ripley went to another home in McCrory, and Anne went to 
Memphis to sell some real property she owned.76 While she was away, Anne 
suffered a stroke, and Ripley, whose health was declining as a result of heart 
disease, diabetes, and dementia, was taken to a nursing home by his neph-
ew.77 Ripley executed the 2009 trust amendment while he was in the nursing 
home and remained there until death.78 Sometime during the separation, 
Anne had filed for separate maintenance because her husband was no longer 
providing for her.79 
In addition to Anne’s complete removal from participation in the 2009 
amendment and the disparity between her husband’s wealth and the amount 
left to her by the 2009 amendment, the circuit court highlighted two other 
factors as indicative of Ripley’s intent to deprive. First, the time between 
execution of the 2009 amendment and Ripley’s death was short, less than 
one year.80 Also, the circuit court found evidence of intent to keep Anne 
uninformed regarding the 2009 amendment because she was given copies of 
both the original trust and 2004 trust amendment, but she was not given a 
copy of the 2009 amendment.81 
b. The majority opinion 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas rejected all four of the appellant’s ar-
guments against including the trust in calculating the spousal elective share. 
First, the court agreed with the appellant that Arkansas’s spousal elec-
tive statute limits a spousal election to property owned by a decedent at 
death, but not as an absolute statement.82 The appellant asserted that the 
 
 73. Id. at 14, 434 S.W.3d at 884–85. 
 74. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 884–85. 
 75. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 885. 
 76. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 4, 434 S.W.3d at 880. 
 77. Id. at 4, 434 S.W.3d at 880. 
 78. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 880. 
 79. Id. at 14, 434 S.W.3d at 885. 
 80. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 885. 
 81. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 885. 
 82. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 9, 434 S.W.3d at 882. 
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elective share cannot include trust property because a trust settlor is divested 
of ownership at death and to hold otherwise would be to invalidate the Ar-
kansas Trust Code.83 The court responded by explaining that the appellant’s 
first argument overlooks the finding of fraud.84 The lower court did not in-
validate the trust for all purposes, but only for the limited purpose of includ-
ing it in the calculation of the elective share.85 The court affirmed that the 
issue was not whether the revocable trust became irrevocable upon Ripley’s 
death; instead, the issue was whether the trust, despite its otherwise irrevo-
cable character that manifested upon Ripley’s death, should be included in 
the estate for the purpose of calculating the spousal elective share when a 
court finds intent to deprive the spouse.86  
The court remarked that “Arkansas law has long recognized the con-
cept of fraud on the surviving spouse’s marital rights to property and an 
elective share” and cited Hamilton to support the court’s historical favoring 
of zealous protection of those rights even when they are contrary to a dece-
dent’s intent.87 Thus, the court’s finding of an exception to the general rule 
that Arkansas’ spousal elective statute limits a spousal election to property 
owned by a decedent at death was “expressly linked” to a finding of fraudu-
lent intent.88 
Second, the court rejected the assertion that the evidence did not sup-
port a finding that Ripley intended to deprive Anne.89 In doing so, the court 
agreed with the lower court’s reliance on Richards for the use of an intent-
based test supplemented with some factors from Karsenty v. Schoukroun,90 a 
Maryland decision on a similar case.91 The Maryland decision also support-
ed the idea that there can be no fixed rule for determining intent; instead, 
these cases “should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis considering all 
relevant facts and circumstances.”92 
After synthesizing applicable factors from the battery of cases cited in 
Richards (Missouri, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Illinois) and from Karsenty 
(Maryland), the factors the court determined weighed in favor of fraud in-
cluded the degree of deprivation (Ripley left Anne approximately 1.6% of 
his total worth); the relationship between the spouses leading up to death; 
the withdrawal of Anne’s participatory status as trustee; the time span be-
 
 83. Id. at 6–7, 434 S.W.3d at 881. 
 84. Id. at 7, 434 S.W.3d at 881. 
 85. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 881. 
 86. Id. at 7–8, 434 S.W.3d at 881. 
 87. Id. at 10, 434 S.W.3d at 883 (citing Hamilton v. Hamilton, 317 Ark. 572, 578, 879 
S.W.2d 416, 419 (1994)). 
 88. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 7, 434 S.W.3d at 881. 
 89. Id. at 15, 434 S.W.3d at 885. 
 90. 959 A.2d 1147 (Md. 2008). 
 91. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 12, 434 S.W.3d at 884. 
 92. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 884 (citing Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1160). 
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tween the last amendment and Ripley’s death (less than one year); and the 
lack of notice given to Anne regarding her removal as a beneficiary.93 Nota-
bly, the high court felt that, in addition to the circuit court’s findings of fact, 
fraudulent intent was evident on the face of the documents when considered 
in whole.94 
Third, the court disagreed with the appellant’s argument that Anne 
should be required to prove the common law elements of fraud.95 In addition 
to a lack of authority for the proposition, the court cited Maryland’s 
Karsenty decision and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit in noting that other courts have expressly rejected the ap-
plication of common law fraud doctrine in the context of cases involving 
fraud on marital rights.96 
The last argument lost by the appellant was an alternative argument: if 
the court did find fraudulent intent, then the 2009 trust amendment should 
be invalidated entirely and the property should be distributed according to 
the terms of the 2004 amendment.97 Because the Arkansas General Assem-
bly has not adopted the concept of an augmented estate, judicially imposing 
it would be inappropriate.98 In rebuttal, the court pointed out that although 
the Richards court found fraudulent intent lacking, the decision carved out 
the potential for a future court to invalidate an inter vivos trust if it found 
that it amounted to a fraudulent scheme to defeat the spouse’s marital 
rights.99 Furthermore, the court felt that invalidating the trust for the narrow 
purpose of calculating the elective share was harmonious with the Arkansas 
Trust Code and the Arkansas Probate Code and cited Illinois Supreme Court 
common law stating that “merely because a trust is deemed void as to the 
widow’s right does not necessarily make it void as to the rights of other 
beneficiaries.”100 
c. The dissent 
In asserting that the court’s decision “rejects black-letter Arkansas pro-
bate law,” the two-member dissent essentially ignored the finding of fraud 
 
 93. Id. at 13–14, 434 S.W.3d at 884–85.   
 94. Id. at 15, 434 S.W.3d at 885. 
 95. Id. at 16, 434 S.W.3d at 886. 
 96. Id. at 17, 434 S.W.3d at 886 (stating that “‘fraud in the classic sense’ is not at issue 
and a court should instead look for an ‘improper circumvention of marital rights of the sur-
viving spouse’” (citing Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1173)). 
 97. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 18, 434 S.W.3d at 887. 
 98. Id., at 17–18, 434 S.W.3d at 887. 
 99. Id. at 18, 434 S.W.3d at 887. 
 100. Id. at 19, 434 S.W.3d at 887 (citing Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 253 N.E.2d 
417, 419 (Ill. 1969)). 
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and focused on the appellant’s first and fourth arguments.101 The dissent 
cited the Arkansas elective share statute102 in opining that the elective share 
is comprised of dower and dower rights extend only to the decedent’s es-
tate.103 
The dissent also cited Gregory in support of the idea that the right to an 
elective share vests upon death but only in the probate estate of the dece-
dent.104 Unlike the majority, the dissent insisted this is an absolute rule, sub-
ject to no exceptions. To believe thus, as the majority pointed out, ignores 
West and Richards, which implicate intent as the appropriate consideration, 
and ignores Dahlmann, Gregory, and Hamilton for the principle that the 
“surviving spouse’s right to an elective share is inviolate.”105  
The justices further argued that this new law will confuse the realm of 
estate planning because under this new law “any transfer of personalty to a 
person other than the spouse would compel the conclusion that the spouse 
was defrauded by the transfer and deprived of her marital rights.”106 Alt-
hough this articulation of the law ignores most of the majority’s analysis 
regarding fraudulent circumstances, and the court’s holding was explicitly 
limited to revocable inter vivos trusts, denying that Thompson will confuse 
estate planning in Arkansas is difficult.  
Indeed, tests based primarily on the intent of the transferor receive 
much criticism on the ground that they call the validity of any transfer made 
by a spouse into doubt.107 In an ominous foreshadowing of things to come, 
the dissent lamented that “[t]he confusion to follow this opinion is indeed 
disturbing.”108 
III. ARGUMENT 
“In cases of this type there can be no fixed rule of determining when a 
transfer or gift is fraudulent to a wife; each case must be determined on its 
own facts and circumstances.”109 Thompson’s holding is an explicitly narrow 
 
 101. Id. at 23, 434 S.W.3d at 889 (Hart, J., dissenting). Justice Hart wrote the dissent, 
which was joined by Justice Baker. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 889. 
 102. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-401 (Repl. 2012). 
 103. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 20–21, 434 S.W.3d at 888–89 (Hart, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 20, 434 S.W.3d at 888. 
 105. See cases cited supra notes 54–63. 
 106. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 22, 434 S.W.3d at 889 (Hart, J., dissenting). The dis-
sent further went on to speculate that this rule would permit the elective share to reach not 
only trusts, but payable on death accounts, co-ownership registration with the right of survi-
vorship, and insurance proceeds over which the decedent retained a general power of ap-
pointment. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 889. 
 107. Id. at 22, 434 S.W.3d at 889; Hanke v. Hanke, 459 A.2d 246, 248 (N.H. 1983). 
 108. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 22, 434 S.W.3d at 889 (Hart, J., dissenting). 
  109. Id. at 12, 434 S.W.3d at 884 (majority opinion). 
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one in that it applies only to revocable inter vivos trusts in the context of 
fraudulent intent. The court relied on authority from four other courts in 
expressly adopting a case-by-case approach, and every case cited in Thomp-
son gives significant attention to intent.110 A closer look at Thompson and 
these other decisions shows that a label of fraudulent intent is merely a post-
hoc justification for a decision based on what the court thinks is equitable. 
The concept of fraudulent intent can be described as nebulous at best. 
Numerous locutions are used throughout various courts in an effort to con-
ceptually summarize what it is that will render a nonprobate transfer subject 
to the reach of the elective share. While the Thompson court speaks con-
stantly in terms of “the Decedent’s intent to deprive Appellee of her marital 
rights,” the Maryland decision it relies upon heavily contradicts this lan-
guage by stating that “a decedent’s intent to defraud her or his surviving 
spouse is not the proper focus” and “the intent that matters is the decedent’s 
intent to structure a transaction by which she or he parts with ownership of 
the property in form, but not in substance.”111  
Another decision relied upon by Thompson shows a similar discrepan-
cy: 
Intention and purpose are not necessarily the controlling factors in de-
termining whether a transfer is fraudulent. One must take into considera-
tion the effect of the transfer. In other words, if the properties transferred 
prior to death are of such a quantity in relation to the total estate as the 
widow is substantially deprived of that which she would otherwise take 
under our statutes, then from such a transfer fraud may be presumed un-
der certain conditions and circumstances.
112
 
Hence, fraudulent intent in the context of these cases has no definite 
meaning; it is merely a statement of a result rather than a rationale for reach-
ing the result.113 Consequently, courts that rely on intent as a critical point of 
the analysis retain vast flexibility in upholding or invalidating a transfer that 
diminishes the elective share because no single factor controls.114 The diffi-
 
 110. Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1170 (Md. 2008); Rose v. St. Louis Union 
Trust Co., 253 N.E.2d 417, 420 (Ill. 1969); In re Estate of Steck, 81 N.W.2d 729, 734 (Wis. 
1957); Potter v. Winter, 280 S.W.2d 27, 37 (Mo. 1955). 
 111. Compare Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 14, 434 S.W.3d at 885, with Karsenty, 959 
A.2d at 1170. 
 112. Sherrill v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798, 802–03 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967). 
 113. See Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 192 (Ill. 1978) (“The use of 
the phrase ‘intent to defraud’ is confusing and carries a connotation not relevant to the ques-
tion to be resolved.”); Melvin J. Sykes, Inter Vivos Transfers in Violation of the Rights of 
Surviving Spouses, 10 MD. L. REV. 1, 7 (1949). 
 114. Sykes, supra note 113, at 7. 
88 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
culty and variability in applying an intent-based test is undoubtedly why 
some jurisdictions reject the use of such a standard.115 
A. Fraudulent Intent: An Exceedingly Malleable Analysis in the Context 
of Spousal Disinheritance 
As the Thompson court made clear, “‘fraud in the classic sense’ is not 
at issue, and a court should instead look for an ‘improper circumvention of 
marital rights of the surviving spouse.’”116 Although the Thompson court 
focused on the degree of deprivation and the lack of notice in finding that 
Ripley intended to deprive Anne of her elective share, it advocates using a 
totality of the circumstances to determine whether fraudulent intent was 
present. The following synthesis of factors from other jurisdictions relied 
upon by the Thompson court identifies what other factors, both explicit and 
implicit, often go into a determination of fraudulent intent.117 These factors 
include the degree of control retained; the degree of deprivation; alternative 
support; the relationship between the settlor and beneficiary; the nature of 
the spousal relationship; the anticipation of death; the presence of considera-
tion; and consent or waiver. These cases demonstrate that these factors are 
very malleable, leading ultimately to unpredictable results. 
1. Control 
Despite the Thompson court’s almost nonexistent attention to it, the 
degree of control retained by the settlor over the nonprobate transfer is like-
ly the most significant factor inherent to these analyses.118 The premise be-
hind using control as a factor is that “a trust settlor should not be allowed to 
retain all the benefits of ownership without assuming any of the burdens.”119 
As important as the policy behind the spousal elective share is, the rival in-
terest of free alienation must be balanced against it.120 
 
 115. See Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 1984) (stressing that its objec-
tive test requires no consideration of motive, intention, good faith, or whether the spouse 
made an illusory, colorable, or fraudulent transfer). 
 116. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 17, 434 S.W.3d at 886 (citing Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 
1173). 
 117. Id. at 11–12, 434 S.W.3d at 883–84. The focus of this note’s factors synthesis is on 
Missouri, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Maryland because the Thompson court express-
ly relied on decisions from these five jurisdictions. 
 118. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1174; Roe, supra note 33, at 755. 
 119. Sieh v. Sieh, 713 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Iowa 2006). 
 120. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 317 Ark. 572, 578, 879 S.W.2d 416, 419 (1994) (“The elec-
tive share provisions are designed to strike a balance between a testator’s right to control the 
distribution of his or her property for life, while preserving the State’s interest in protecting 
the surviving spouse.”). 
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Whether the settlor retained excessive control over the nonprobate 
transfer invariably presents a threshold question, even if an implicit one. 
Retention of control is so important some jurisdictions advocate a binary, 
control-based test to the exclusion of other tests; in these jurisdictions, if the 
settlor retains excessive control, the transfer is held invalid and subject to 
the elective share.121 In other jurisdictions, the retention of control does not 
automatically subject the nonprobate transfer to the elective share.122 These 
jurisdictions are similar to the binary jurisdictions in that “[i]f no control is 
retained, there can be no fraud,” but these jurisdictions differ from the bina-
ry jurisdictions because “[e]ven if control is retained, the transfer can be 
technically valid,” in which case the court would apply a factors analysis to 
determine whether the transferred assets are subject to the elective share.123 
This is the category Thompson and the decisions it relies upon fall into. 
How much control is excessive control? Though the question begs ask-
ing, it is difficult to answer because the degree of control that may be con-
sidered excessive varies within and between jurisdictions.124 That is, juris-
dictions that allegedly use a binary, control-based test often consider other 
factors in determining whether the settlor retained excessive control,125 and 
 
 121. See, e.g., Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 843 P.2d 240, 245 (Kan. 1992) (“[I]f . . . the [set-
tlor] retains the power of revocation, it is fallacious, illusive and deceiving, and will be con-
sidered as fraud on the rights of the widow where she is deprived of her distributive share.”); 
Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572, 574–75 (Mass. 1984) (stating that “the estate of a dece-
dent . . . shall include the value of assets held in an inter vivos trust created by the deceased 
spouse as to which the deceased spouse alone retained the power during his or her life to 
direct the disposition of those trust assets for his or her benefit, as, for example, by the exer-
cise of a power of appointment or by revocation of the trust”); Dreher v. Dreher, 634 S.E.2d 
646, 650 (S.C. 2006) (concluding in regard to a revocable trust that the decedent “retained 
substantial control because he ‘retained such extensive powers over the assets of the trust that 
he ha[d] until [his] death the same rights in the assets after creation of the trust that he had 
before its creation’”). 
  122. See Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1174; Knell v. Price, 550 A.2d 413, 416 (Md. 1988). 
 123. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1174 (stating that “other considerations must exist concurrent-
ly with retained control for a surviving spouse to invalidate the transfer”); see Johnson v. La 
Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 192 (Ill. 1978); Methodist Episcopal Church of Emory 
Chapel of Ellicotts Mills in Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Hadfield, 453 A.2d 145, 149 (Md. 1982); 
Raymond C. O’Brien, Integrating Marital Property into a Spouse’s Elective Share, 59 CATH. 
U.L. REV. 617, 650 (2010) (“Like Newman and subsequent decisions, the Maryland court 
does not consider retention of control by the decedent nor intent to defraud as determinative 
factors.”). 
 124. Hanke v. Hanke, 459 A.2d 246, 249 (N.H. 1983); W.D. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE 
WIDOW’S SHARE 93 (1960) (“Most courts, even in jurisdictions that purport to follow the 
[control-based] doctrine, do not practice what they preach. . . . In other words, the courts, 
consciously or otherwise, are influenced by factors other than mere retention of control. But 
the courts already committed to the ‘control’ rationale naturally tend to announce the decision 
in terms of the control factor. In many cases, violence has been done to the doctrine in order 
to square the result with the doctrine.”); see Sykes, supra note 113, at 4–5. 
 125. MACDONALD, supra note 124, at 94–95. 
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their holdings may apply so narrowly to a certain set of facts that the benefit 
of an easy-to-apply, control-based test is obscured.126 
While some jurisdictions do consider the power to revoke a trust to be 
excessive control, most courts reject this as a dispositive factor.127 Instead, 
the retention of absolute dominion and control by the decedent during life 
generally does not give rise to per se fraud on marital rights; it simply means 
the property will be subject to a court’s evaluation of the case on its equi-
ties.128 
In addition to the degree of control technically retained, a related factor 
courts often look to is the degree of control actually exercised and whether 
the exercise of power was “unfettered.”129 In the case of a settlor who has 
retained absolute control over a trust, the court might consider the accessi-
bility that the settlor actually enjoys.130 For instance, funds in an individual 
retirement account may be technically accessible, but the ease of access rela-
tive to a checking or savings account and the accompanying tax conse-
quences of making a withdrawal may weigh in favor of less control retained 
and more validity.131 Similarly, if the settlor retains the right to invade the 
trust, a court may find it somewhat redemptive that the right was never actu-
ally exercised.132 
As the name implies, trusts created as irrevocable trusts are generally 
accompanied by a relinquishment of power. But, even in the context of an 
irrevocable trust, the court may still find that the decedent retained substan-
tial control if he was the beneficiary of the trust income for life.133 Also, if a 
trust makes use of several different types of nonprobate transfers with vary-
ing levels of control retained by the settlor, the court will likely consider 
 
 126. Sullivan, 460 N.E.2d at 577–78 (stating “[w]hat we have announced as a rule for the 
future hardly resolves all the problems that may arise” and suggesting that the rule would be 
different if the power of appointment was held jointly with another person, if some or all of 
the trust assets were conveyed by a third party, if the trust was made prior to marriage, or if 
the trust contained insurance policies over which the decedent retained control). 
 127. See Hanke, 459 A.2d at 248–49; MACDONALD, supra note 124, at 91–92 (discussing 
the potentially high cost of revocation and noting of a revocable trust that “complete owner-
ship is at all times attainable by a stroke of [the grantor’s] own pen”). 
 128. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1159–63. 
 129. Id. at 1178. 
 130. Id. at 1175. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 195 (Ill. 1978) (finding a 
transfer valid because “[t]here [was] no evidence that Mrs. Johnson made any withdrawals 
from the principal or otherwise exercised any of her reserved powers to deplete the trust 
assets”). 
 133. Sherrill v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967) (invalidating an 
irrevocable trust that provided the decedent would receive income for life). 
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how much control is associated with the assets that comprise the majority of 
the trust.134  
Another standard asks whether the control retained was “of such a de-
gree as to reduce the trustees to the status of agents.”135 This same case held 
that a reservation of a power of appointment did not render the trust inva-
lid.136 Other jurisdictions, however, disagree with this stance.137 
Although the Thompson court did not acknowledge the degree of con-
trol Ripley retained over the trust in the most express of terms, it did consid-
er control in several ways. Most importantly, its holding was expressly lim-
ited to revocable trusts, which signals that the court would not be bound by 
its ruling in the context of a settlor that relinquishes substantially more con-
trol over nonprobate assets.138 Also, the court noted that the trust distributed 
principal and income to Ripley for his lifetime, which shows that he actually 
exercised the substantial control he retained.139 
So, retaining control is necessary, not sufficient, to a finding of fraud. 
A helpful heuristic in conceptualizing the effect of control in these cases is 
that retaining control does not necessarily indicate an invalid or fraudulent 
transfer, but relinquishing control entirely will likely indicate a valid or non-
fraudulent transfer.140 
2. Degree of Deprivation 
“The degree to which an inter vivos transfer deprives a surviving 
spouse of property that she or he would otherwise take as part of the dece-
dent’s estate is also extremely significant.”141 Every jurisdiction cited in 
Thompson turns largely on the degree of deprivation.142 In some contexts, it 
 
 134. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1175. 
 135. In re Estate of Steck, 81 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Wis. 1957). 
 136. Id. at 733–34. 
 137. See Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 1984). 
 138. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 19, 434 S.W.3d 877, 887. 
 139. Id. at 21, 434 S.W.3d at 888. 
 140. See Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1173 (Md. 2008) (“[A]n inter vivos 
transfer in which a decedent gives up all control of the transferred property may not be inval-
idated by a surviving spouse as an unlawful frustration of the spouse’s statutory share.”). 
 141. Id. at 1176; Edgar v. Fitzpatrick, 369 S.W.2d 592, 600 (Mo. App. 1963) (“Running 
through all the cases, whether by express statement or by implication, is the all-important 
consideration of extent and proportion—that is, the proportion which the property transferred 
in deprivation of the widow’s marital rights bears to the whole of the transferor’s assets.”). 
 142. See Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1176 (stating “[t]he degree to which an inter vivos trans-
fer deprives a surviving spouse of property that she or he would otherwise take as part of the 
decedent’s estate is also extremely significant”); Potter v. Winter, 280 S.W.2d 27, 37 (Mo. 
1955) (stating that net income for life in half of the trust corpus was not indicative of intent to 
defraud spouse); Sherrill v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967) (noting 
that one factor used in subjecting the trust to the elective share was that “stocks placed in the 
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may be the decisive factor.143 In other words, extreme deprivation may allow 
fraudulent intent to be presumed, especially when the spouse is disinherited 
completely.144 
Although previous Arkansas case law has suggested that fraudulent in-
tent must be proven and may never be presumed,145 the courts seem to be 
comfortable with the notion that substantial deprivation, in and of itself, 
gives rise to the presumption of fraudulent intent, especially when the 
spouse is disinherited completely.146 In Thompson, the court seemed very 
concerned by the $100,000 left to Anne of Ripley’s $6,000,000 estate, a 
bequest of 1.6% that fell “woefully short” of providing for her and was akin 
to leaving her “basically nothing.”147  
Notably, the courts may be comfortable with a disinheritance of as 
much as 40% in certain contexts.148 Despite the significance of this factor, 
its wide-ranging parameters make it exceedingly difficult to evaluate and 
summarize in isolation. 
 
trust were a large proportion of the settlor’s personal property”); In re Estate of Steck, 81 
N.W.2d 729, 734 (Wis. 1957) (stating that leaving the entire income from the assets of a 
trust, almost $12,000 yearly, and the right to invade the corpus does not show an intention to 
deprive spouse). 
 143. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1177. 
 144. See Sherrill, 417 S.W.2d at 802–03 (stating that “if the properties transferred prior to 
death are of such a quantity in relation to the total estate as the widow is substantially de-
prived of that which she would otherwise take under our statutes, then from such a transfer 
fraud may be presumed under certain conditions and circumstances”); Simpson v. Fowler, 
No. W2011-02112-COA-R3CV, 2012 WL 3675321, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2012) 
(applying Sherrill). In Sherrill, the decedent, who had an estate worth $478,256, left his 
spouse $2,500 and a life estate in property valued at $196,000. Sherrill, 417 S.W.2d at 800–
02. Although Newman v. Dore was not cited by the Thompson court, it is a landmark case 
and it supports the idea that significant deprivation that occurs without the surviving spouse’s 
knowledge may give rise to the presumption of fraud as well. See Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 
966, 968 (N.Y. 1937). 
 145. West v. West, 120 Ark. 500, 504, 179 S.W. 1017, 1018 (1915) (“Fraud is never 
presumed, but must be proved, and the burden was on the defendant to show that the deed 
had been made in fraud of her marital rights.”). 
 146. See Whittington v. Whittington, 106 A.2d 72, 78 (Md. 1954) (noting that the distin-
guishing factor between two past cases with similar facts but dissimilar outcomes was the 
degree of deprivation). In one of the two cases, Mushaw v. Mushaw, in which the decedent 
left his spouse nothing and created trusts totaling $36,000, the court acknowledged the same 
in saying that “[t]he salient fact is that the widow is completely stripped of her marital rights 
in the personal property of her husband. This may be a matter of degree, but it appears to be 
the only basis on which the decisions can be reconciled.” Mushaw v. Mushaw, 39 A.2d 465, 
467–68 (Md. 1944). 
 147. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 13, 434 S.W.3d 877, 884–85. 
 148. See Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1177; Whittington, 106 A.2d at 77 (explaining that the 
decedent wanted to provide for his sons and did not deprive his wife entirely because, under 
his arrangements, she would take one-third of his estate, although the trusts resulted in her 
taking 40% less than she would have had they been invalidated). 
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3. Alternative Support 
The court may also analyze alternative support to determine whether 
the disinheritance was reasonable under the circumstances. Within the con-
text of support provided by the decedent, alternative support may include 
both probate and nonprobate arrangements and inter vivos gifts left to the 
surviving spouse by the decedent.149 If the court believes the decedent made 
reasonable provisions for the surviving spouse through probate transfers, 
nonprobate transfers, inter vivos gifts, or a combination thereof, it may 
weigh against a finding of fraudulent intent.150 For example, in Maryland, 
the Karsenty court considered a $200,000 life insurance policy that the sur-
viving spouse benefitted from; her inheritance of a vehicle worth $22,000 
and a thrift savings plan worth $12,000; and the fact that the decedent paid 
off a $17,000 balance on the spouse’s car loan and paid her $1,200 in 
monthly rent.151  
Conversely, alternative means of support from the decedent that benefit 
someone other than the surviving spouse may weigh in favor of fraudulent 
intent. If, for example, the decedent has life insurance policies or bonds pay-
able to beneficiaries other than the spouse in addition to a  
trust that works in derogation of the spouse’s elective share, the court is 
more likely to find that the decedent intended to disinherit the surviving 
spouse.152 
In addition to considering alternative means of support provided by the 
decedent, the surviving spouse’s independent wealth may factor into the 
analysis.153 The Karsenty court went so far as to consider the worth of the 
surviving spouse’s own home, her income, and her pensions.154 As demon-
strated by an Illinois case, a court may have a difficult time finding fraudu-
lent intent when the surviving spouse has a net value in excess of 
$2,000,000 because the court presumes that the decedent took the surviving 
spouse’s wealth into consideration when making provisions for death.155 In 
other words, you may intend to use nonprobate transfers to deprive your 
spouse of his or her elective share as long as they are rich.156  
 
 149. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1177–78. 
 150. Id. at 1177; Simpson v. Fowler, No. W2013-02109-COA-R3CV, 2014 WL 1601137, 
at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2014). 
 151. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1178. 
 152. See Sherrill v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967) (stating that 
bonds and insurance policies totaling $11,500 payable to the decedent’s sister and niece were 
evidence of intent to deprive). 
 153. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1165. 
 154. Id. at 1154. 
 155. Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 195 (Ill. 1978). 
 156. See id. 
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Interestingly, the Thompson court rejected the idea that alternative sup-
port weighed against a finding of fraud. The court acknowledged that Ripley 
showered Anne with gifts of great value while he was alive,157 and Ripley’s 
nephew, the appellant, argued that the gifts demonstrated Ripley’s intent to 
provide for Anne by other means.158 Still, because the gifts were made to the 
spouse prior to Ripley’s acts of disinheritance, the court said this factor did 
not discount a finding of fraudulent intent.159 Because the gifts were not tes-
tamentary in nature, the Thompson court found considering them in lieu of 
an elective share to be inappropriate.160 According to the Karsenty decision, 
which Thompson relied upon, a court should consider inter vivos gifts that 
the decedent gave to a surviving spouse.161 Whether the Thompson court 
would embrace this particular facet of Karsenty under different factual cir-
cumstances is uncertain.  
The Thompson court gave no attention to the independent wealth of 
Anne.162 Although the facts disclose that Anne had left to sell some real es-
tate she owned, this fact was mentioned only in passing and seemingly to 
explain her absence from Ripley.163 
4. The Relationship Between the Settlor and Intended Beneficiary 
Generally speaking and all other factors constant, a nonprobate transfer 
that works to the derogation of the elective share is more likely to be upheld 
if the provisions are for the benefit of the decedent’s children; the courts 
seem to be sympathetic to an intent to provide for one’s own children, espe-
cially if the surviving spouse is not left destitute. In Karsenty, the decedent’s 
daughter was the beneficiary of the nonprobate assets that diminished the 
elective share, and the court remanded the case so the trial court could con-
sider this.164 In Whittington, a case in which the court allowed the surviving 
spouse to suffer a 40% decrease in her share of the property imposed by a 
nonprobate transfer, the decedent’s sons were the beneficiaries of the as-
sets.165  
 
 157. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 13, 434 S.W.3d 877, 885. 
 158. Id. at 16, 434 S.W.3d at 886. 
 159. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 886. 
 160. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 886. 
 161. Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1177 (Md. 2008) (“A scrutinizing court 
also should consider as part of this factor inter vivos gifts that the decedent gave to the sur-
viving spouse.”). 
 162. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 12–16, 434 S.W.3d at 884–86 (failing to discuss the 
status of Anne Thompson’s independent wealth along with the factors used by the circuit 
court or anywhere else in the opinion). 
 163. Id. at 4, 434 S.W.3d at 880. 
 164. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1179–80. 
 165. Whittington v. Whittington, 106 A.2d 72, 76 (Md. 1954). 
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This concept may extend not only to children, but dependents general-
ly. In Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, the court upheld a revocable trust 
that benefited the decedent’s mother, who was financially dependent on the 
decedent.166 However, Sherrill v. Mallicote, a case in which the court invali-
dated an irrevocable trust that benefited the decedent’s siblings, demon-
strates that disinheriting transfers that benefit someone other than the dece-
dent’s children or dependents are less likely to be valid.167 Notably, in 
Thompson, Ripley had no children or dependents.168 
Although naming one’s children as the beneficiaries of a nonprobate 
transfer that diminishes the elective share may mitigate a finding of fraudu-
lent intent to some degree, ensuring that the degree of spousal deprivation is 
not egregious is likely more important.169 For example, in White v. Sargent, 
the trust’s stated purpose was to provide for the long-term care and educa-
tion of the decedent’s children; however, the court found fraudulent intent 
because the creation of the trust left the surviving spouse with “essentially 
no means of support.”170 Furthermore, if the court feels that the surviving 
spouse is adequately provided for, it may even uphold a transfer when the 
beneficiaries are friends or charity groups.171 
Another aspect of the relationship between the settlor and beneficiary 
that the court may analyze is the intent of the transferee.172 If, for example, a 
transferee received property under a mutual agreement that the transferor 
would remain the practical owner, such a sham transfer would weigh in fa-
vor of invalidation.173 
5. The Nature of the Spousal Relationship 
The nature of the spousal relationship is likely to get some attention 
whether the factor is explicitly listed in the court’s traditional factors test or 
implicitly considered as one of many factors inherent to analyzing intent. 
 
 166. Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 195, 197 (Ill. 1978). 
 167. See Sherrill v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798, 803–04 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967). 
 168. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 2, 434 S.W.3d at 879. 
 169. See White v. Sargent, 875 A.2d 658, 668 (D.C. 2005); Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust 
Co., 253 N.E.2d 417, 420 (Ill. 1969) (remanding a case in which the decedent demonstrated 
an intent to leave the bulk of his estate (60%) to his children in order to determine what por-
tion of the decedent’s total property was available to the surviving spouse). 
 170. Sargent, 875 A.2d at 666. 
 171. See Windsor v. Leonard, 475 F.2d 932, 933–34 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that the 
surviving spouse was left with a 50% share in an estate exceeding $100,000 in addition to his 
personal holdings worth some $140,000). 
 172. See Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1175–76 (Md. 2008); Sykes, supra 
note 113, at 15. 
 173. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1176. 
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Tennessee, for example, includes the factor explicitly as part of its fac-
tors analysis.174 In deciding to invalidate the transfer, the Sherrill court noted 
that the decedent feared his wife wanted a divorce as demonstrated by his 
consistently asking her over the two years leading up to his death whether 
she was going to file for divorce.175 And, in Johnson, the court mentioned 
that the spouses had “a warm and loving marriage” in upholding the trans-
fer.176 Although a court may not include the factor explicitly in its battery of 
factors, it is a factor that will likely influence the court to some degree; it 
may weigh strongly or barely be recognized depending on the facts of the 
case.177 In Sargent, the spouses were separated and seeking a second divorce 
when the trust was created.178 The decedent had a history of lying about his 
finances to escape paying child support and alimony, and the court used this 
as a factor weighing in favor of fraudulent intent.179 
Whether the surviving spouse abandoned the decedent is an important 
consideration.180 A finding of fraudulent intent may not pose such an unfor-
giving standard where a deed is made for the purpose of defeating the mari-
tal rights of a deserter spouse even though the predeceasing spouse retains 
practical ownership during life and relinquishes control entirely.181 A Mis-
souri statute bolsters the idea that one cannot abandon a spouse without 
cause and expect to receive an elective share,182 so this issue is obviously 
implicated, but this question would invite finger-pointing and a troublesome 
parsing of facts. 
Even though the Maryland court in Karsenty did not include the nature 
of the spousal relationship as part of its factors test explicitly, it did indicate 
that the trial court should consider whether and to what extent the surviving 
spouse had cared for the decedent during his final illness.183 
The Thompson court gave extensive consideration to Anne and Rip-
ley’s spousal relationship in its determination of fraudulent intent. The court 
found that Ripley’s intent to deprive Anne “manifested sometime in 2008 
when his health had begun to deteriorate and the parties were no longer liv-
 
 174. Sherrill v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798, 802–03 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967). 
 175. Id. at 802. 
 176. Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 195 (Ill. 1978). 
 177. See Potter v. Winter, 280 S.W.2d 27, 36–37 (Mo. 1955) (stating in its final conclu-
sion that “[t]he voluminous record reveals convincing evidence of Mr. Potter’s affection and 
provident consideration for plaintiff” and distinguishing these findings with those from a case 
in which the decedent was “obsessed” with ensuring his spouse would not receive any more 
than $200 per month, the sum she earned prior to their marriage). 
 178. White v. Sargent, 875 A.2d 658, 661 (D.C. 2005). 
 179. Id. at 665. 
 180. Sykes, supra note 113, at 14. 
 181. See Whitehill v. Thiess, 158 A. 347, 347–48 (Md. 1932). 
 182. See MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 474.140 (1955). 
 183. Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1180 (Md. 2008). 
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ing together.”184 Over the course of their relationship, the spouses grew dis-
tant. Where once Ripley lavished his wife with gifts and promised to care 
for her needs, she eventually felt compelled to file for separate mainte-
nance.185 Instead of using gifts to find alternative support, which would 
weigh in favor of a valid transfer, the court actually used the gifts Ripley 
gave his wife to characterize the later years of their relationship as relatively 
affectionless, which weighs in favor of fraudulent intent. 
The court is also more likely to find fraudulent intent when a spouse 
accrues no assets of his or her own due to raising children and homemak-
ing.186 As Thompson demonstrates, a spouse who operates as a homemaker 
may compel a court toward a finding of fraudulent intent, even in the ab-
sence of children, and especially if the spouse stopped working at the dece-
dent’s request because the decedent promised to provide for the spouse.187 
6. Anticipation of Death 
Whether the decedent made the transfer at issue in anticipation of death 
is commonly considered in a court’s determination of fraudulent intent;188 
however, this factor is largely superficial as it is easily manipulated and 
outweighed by other factors. Generally, the less time between a decedent’s 
disinheriting acts and death, the more suspect his or her intent.189 The court 
may also look at the decedent’s knowledge as to his or her own state of 
health.190 
It is not uncommon for courts to simply ignore time spans that weigh 
against a finding of fraudulent intent. In Sargent, the court said although 
“twenty-nine months is more than ample time in which to transfer assets to a 
trust and to do so in good faith, other factors prevent the court from holding 
that this transfer was in good faith.”191 In Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 
 
 184. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 14, 434 S.W.3d 877, 885. 
 185. Id. at 2, 13, 434 S.W.3d at 879, 885. 
 186. See White v. Sargent, 875 A.2d 658, 667 (D.C. 2005) (“The trial court did not err in 
so finding, particularly in light of the fact that Mrs. Sargent stayed home to care for the chil-
dren at her husband’s insistence and therefore accrued no assets of her own.”). 
 187. See Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 2, 434 S.W.3d at 879. 
 188. Id. at 14, 434 S.W.3d at 885; White, 875 A.2d at 666; Johnson v. La Grange State 
Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 188 (Ill. 1978); Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 253 N.E.2d 417, 
419 (Ill. 1969); Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1164; Sherrill v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798, 802 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1967); In re Estate of Steck, 81 N.W.2d 729, 734 (Wis. 1957). The Thomp-
son court, as well as every opinion cited by the Thompson court, considered the decedent’s 
anticipation of death. 
  189. See White, 875 A.2d at 666 (referring to this factor as whether or not there is a 
“brink of death” transfer). 
 190. Potter v. Winter, 280 S.W.2d 27, 35–36 (Mo. 1955). 
 191. White, 875 A.2d at 666 (focusing on the decedent’s knowledge of his poor health 
established by a previous medical malpractice complaint filed by the decedent in which he 
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although the settlor died five years after the creation of the trust that dimin-
ished the elective share, the court remanded the case so the trial court could 
determine other facts, especially the degree to which the surviving spouse 
was deprived.192 
Similarly, courts may ignore suspiciously short time spans that would 
otherwise weigh in favor of fraudulent intent. The Johnson court upheld a 
trust even though it was made only seven months prior to the settlor’s 
death.193 In Karsenty, the decedent died less than four months after creating 
the trust at issue, and the court acknowledged that the decedent knew he was 
very sick.194 The Karsenty court went so far as to use the decedent’s antici-
pation of death to affirmatively bolster its argument against a finding of 
fraudulent intent; the court used the factor to support the idea that the dece-
dent was getting his financial affairs in order to “cover everybody.”195 Simi-
larly, in Potter v. Winter, the decedent created the trust just three months 
before death, and the court acknowledged that the decedent knew he would 
not live long.196 Nonetheless, the court did not find fraudulent intent and 
upheld the trust because it made sense that he “would wish to put his affairs 
in order.”197 
Although the Thompson court could just as easily have used Ripley’s 
anticipation of death to show his intent to “put his affairs in order,” the court 
instead cited Ripley’s failing health and the short time span between Rip-
ley’s disinheriting acts and his death as evidence of fraudulent intent.198 But, 
in Windsor v. Leonard, a District of Columbia court found that eighteen 
months was “hardly the kind of ‘brink of death’ transfer that might indicate 
bad faith on the part of the transferor,”199 most likely because the court felt 
none of the other factors weighed in favor of fraudulent intent.  
The only conclusion that follows from the courts’ treatment of the an-
ticipation-of-death analyses is that the factor is somewhat vestigial and rela-
tively unimportant; the courts address it as a matter of tradition, but the 
 
stated that after suffering a heart attack and two strokes, he was aware that his “current heart 
failure and disability . . . [was] irreversible, and [he was] now subjected to sudden death”). 
 192. Rose, 253 N.E.2d at 420. 
 193. Johnson, 383 N.E.2d at 197. 
 194. Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1152 (Md. 2008). The decedent made the 
trust on June 23, 2004, while undergoing chemotherapy, radiation treatment, and a stem cell 
transplant and died on October 18, 2004. Id. 
 195. Id. at 1155. 
 196. Potter v. Winter, 280 S.W.2d 27, 35–36 (Mo. 1955). 
 197. Id. at 37. 
 198. See In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 2, 14, 434 S.W.3d 877, 879, 885. 
Ripley amended the trust to disinherit Anne on May 29, 2009, and died on February 20, 
2010, so the time span was about nine months. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 879, 885. 
 199. Windsor v. Leonard, 475 F.2d 932, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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court will either bend the analysis so that it supports the weight of the evi-
dence or dismiss the factor as relatively unimportant. 
7. Consideration 
Several of the jurisdictions cited in Thompson consider whether or not 
the transfer at issue was made in exchange for valuable consideration.200 In 
Missouri, courts seem to find an absence of consideration to be a necessary 
element in addition to fraudulent intent.201 The exchange of valuable consid-
eration weighs highly in favor of a valid and complete transfer. Most of the 
jurisdictions cited in Thompson also stand by the belief that a settlor has the 
right to alienate his or her own property, even if doing so diminishes the 
elective share, as long as the settlor gives up all control. Notably, cases of 
nonprobate transfers that disinherit a spouse and make it to court are not 
those in which significant consideration has been exchanged. 
8. Consent or Waiver 
Generally, when the decedent has made the transfer at issue surrepti-
tiously, the factors weigh in favor of fraudulent intent, and, when the court 
finds knowledge or consent by the surviving spouse, the factors weigh in 
favor of a valid transfer. Although consent can manifest in an express form, 
such as a prenuptial agreement, the consent required to determine that a 
transfer was not surreptitious need not be express; in some cases, courts 
highlight the factors that weigh in favor of implied consent or constructive 
knowledge. 
a. Implied consent 
A Missouri case demonstrates that, where a spouse has signed trust 
documents agreeing to serve as trustee should the settlor become incapaci-
tated, consent and approval has been granted.202 Similarly, an Illinois court 
asserted that a finding of fraudulent intent must fail where a surviving 
 
 200. See Methodist Episcopal Church of Emory Chapel v. Hadfield, 453 A.2d 145, 147 
(Md. 1982); Potter, 280 S.W.2d at 35; Edgar v. Fitzpatrick, 369 S.W.2d 592, 600 (Mo. App. 
1963); Simpson v. Fowler, No. W2013-02109-COA-R3CV, 2014 WL 1601137, at *3 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2014). 
 201. Potter, 280 S.W.2d at 35 (stating that the general rule in Missouri is that “a convey-
ance of property by the husband without consideration and with the intent and purpose to 
defeat his widow’s marital rights in his property, is a fraud upon such widow and she may 
sue in her own right, and set aside such fraudulent conveyance, and recover the property so 
fraudulently transferred, to the extent of her interest therein”); Edgar, 369 S.W.2d at 600. 
 202. Potter, 280 S.W.2d at 36. 
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spouse knew that the decedent had been meeting with an attorney to prepare 
a trust and chose not to get involved.203 
Even when substantial control is relinquished, disinheritance in the ab-
sence of consent or knowledge is frowned upon. In Sherrill, the irrevocable 
trust that ultimately left the surviving spouse with no support was held inva-
lid and, unsurprisingly, was created without the spouse’s knowledge.204  
The facts in Thompson also led the court to find a lack of consent; the 
court cited the fact that Anne had always been a co-trustee to the trust until 
the last amendment was made, which disinherited her.205 Additionally, she 
was not given a copy to inform her of the trust amendments as she had been 
in the past.206 
b. Express consent 
Couples possessing the requisite legal capacity can contract around 
property rights that would otherwise arise by operation of law upon mar-
riage.207 These agreements commonly take the form of prenuptial and post-
nuptial agreements. 
A prenuptial agreement is a contract made between prospective spous-
es in contemplation of marriage in which they define their property rights 
and regulate the enjoyment and devolution of their real and personal es-
tates.208 Prenuptial agreements are presumptively valid and favored by the 
law as long as they are not contrary to public policy.209 Prenuptial agree-
ments involving fraud, however, are contrary to public policy, and, where 
the intent of the parties is not clear on the face of the agreement, a court will 
look to the circumstances surrounding its execution to determine intent and 
validity in a manner that very much resembles a Thompson standard.210 
B. Combatting Uncertainty After Thompson: Arkansas Nuptial Agree-
ments Can Enhance Predictability 
A prenuptial agreement executed upon consideration of marriage must 
be fair, equitable, and reasonable in view of a totality of the surrounding 
facts and circumstances.211 With a standard that so closely mirrors that of 
 
 203. Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 195 (Ill. 1978). 
 204. Sherrill v. Mallicote, 248, 417 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967). 
 205. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 14, 434 S.W.3d 877, 885. 
 206. Id. at 14, 434 S.W.3d at 885. 
 207. 7 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Waiver of Spousal Rights in Estate of Deceased 
Spouse § 2 (1975). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id. 
 211. Id. 
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Thompson, how much protection can a nuptial agreement actually provide 
against the uncertainty handed down by Thompson? 
Although a nuptial agreement is not necessarily a fail-safe method of 
gaining certainty and protection in estate planning post-Thompson, it can 
afford a significant degree of protection. Despite the importance the court 
gives to the degree of deprivation in cases like Thompson, a court will likely 
uphold a voluntary waiver of spousal rights, even where the degree of  
deprivation is great, if the surviving spouse is found to clearly and unequiv-
ocally waive his or her rights upon being fully informed and advised of the 
spouse’s actual worth.212 
Arkansas has enacted the Arkansas Premarital Agreement Act 
(APAA).213 According to the law, a premarital agreement must be in writing 
and be signed and acknowledged by both parties.214 Parties may agree to the 
elimination or modification of spousal support or any other right not in vio-
lation of public policy and, specifically, not in derogation of the rights of a 
child entitled to support.215 The APAA took effect on July 20, 1987, and it 
applies to any prenuptial agreement occurring on or after that date.216 
The APAA further provides that a prenuptial agreement is not enforce-
able if it was not executed voluntarily or if it was unconscionable when exe-
cuted.217 Here, unconscionability means that a party was not provided a fair 
and reasonable disclosure of the tentative spouse’s property; did not volun-
tarily and expressly waive, in writing and after consulting with legal coun-
sel, any right to disclosure of the tentative spouse’s property beyond that 
provided; and did not, or reasonably could not, have adequate knowledge of 
the tentative spouse’s property.218 
Notably, the protection given by a nuptial agreement is tempered by 
providing that if the agreement causes a party to be eligible for public sup-
port, a court may order the other party to provide support despite the agree-
ment’s terms to the contrary.219 
In Arkansas, provisions in a prenuptial agreement that are dispropor-
tionate to the financial worth of an intended spouse give rise to a presump-
tion of designed concealment.220 It then becomes the burden of the party 
seeking enforcement of the prenuptial to prove that the party seeking rescis-
 
 212. 7 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Waiver of Spousal Rights in Estate of Deceased 
Spouse § 7. 
 213. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-401 to -413 (Repl. 2009). 
 214. Id. § 9-11-402 (Repl. 2009). 
 215. Id. § 9-11-403 (Repl. 2009). 
 216. Id. § 9-11-412 (Repl. 2009). 
 217. Id. § 9-11-406 (Repl. 2009). 
 218. Id.  
 219. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-406(b)(1) (Repl. 2009). 
 220. Faver v. Faver, 266 Ark. 262, 270, 583 S.W.2d 44, 48 (1979). 
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sion had full knowledge of all information affecting the agreement.221 If the 
party seeking enforcement of the prenuptial can meet the burden of proving 
that the party seeking rescission had full disclosure, the court will uphold the 
agreement.222 Even where a spouse is rushed into signing a prenuptial 
agreement that he or she did not read an hour prior to being wed, the agree-
ment will be binding where full disclosure of assets is attached and an attor-
ney is provided.223 
A postnuptial agreement is entered into during marriage to define each 
spouse’s property rights in the event of death or divorce.224 Although many 
states apply the same rules regulating both prenuptial and postnuptial 
agreements, more states impose different standards for finding postnuptial 
agreements valid, and Arkansas is one such state.225  
In Arkansas, a postnuptial agreement is analyzed under contract law; 
marriage is adequate consideration for a prenuptial agreement or an amend-
ment to a prenuptial agreement that occurs after marriage, but it is not ade-
quate consideration for a purely postnuptial agreement—for a purely post-
nuptial agreement, past consideration in the form of marriage is no consid-
eration at all.226 Furthermore, under contract law, parties need not be advised 
of their rights to make a postnuptial agreement valid.227  
So, a prenuptial may be easier to enforce in some ways because, if you 
meet the express provisions of the APAA relating to disclosure, legal coun-
sel, and knowledge, the court should uphold the agreement. But, a postnup-
tial agreement may be easier to enforce in that it does not require legal 
counseling. Also, because marriage is not adequate consideration for a post-
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 223. Id., 816 S.W.2d at 628. 
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marriage is not sufficient consideration to support a postnuptial agreement); Sean Hannon 
Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 839, 881 (2007). 
 226. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-405 (Repl. 2009) (“After marriage, a premarital agreement 
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at 15–16, 249 S.W.3d at 846–47 (upholding a postnuptial agreement because twenty-five 
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 227. Stewart v. Combs, 368 Ark. 121, 123, 128, 243 S.W.3d 294, 296, 300 (2006) (up-
holding a postnuptial agreement where the wife had neither been advised by an attorney nor 
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nuptial, whether there was adequate consideration becomes a relevant issue 
in a postnuptial where it would not in the context of a prenuptial. 
It is also important to note that releasing one’s rights to dower or 
curtesy via contract will not suffice as a release of one’s rights to an elective 
share.228 Although the spousal elective share is comprised of dower or 
curtesy, to release one’s rights to an elective share, the language of the con-
tract must manifest a clear and specific intent to do so.229 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although the probate system values “ease of administration and pre-
dictability of result,”230 cases like Thompson, which implement an unpre-
dictable factors test turning on fraudulent intent, make estate planning very 
difficult.231 This article’s synthesis of factors from jurisdictions relied on by 
the Thompson court can shed significant insight as to how a court may inter-
pret factual circumstances. Still, in order to create as strong an estate plan as 
possible, estate planners going forward must err on the side of caution and 
assume that Thompson’s holding will be extended to any nonprobate trans-
fer where the decedent retains control during life. 
Another way to mitigate the unpredictable rule imposed by Thompson 
is to herald the importance of nuptial agreements like never before. Alt-
hough the enforcement of a nuptial agreement must be fair, equitable, and 
reasonable under the circumstances, Arkansas courts are willing to enforce 
them when the APAA’s statutory requirements are satisfied. Admittedly, 
nuptial agreements may be off-putting because they are unromantic, but, in 
the wake of Thompson and during a time when divorce and remarriage is 
increasingly common, the incentive for considering a nuptial agreement as 
an effective means of risk management is certainly inflated. Accordingly, 
practitioners need to make clients aware that, until Arkansas issues badly 
needed legislation standardizing the law in this area,232 nuptial agreements 
 
 228. See Masterson v. Masterson, 200 Ark. 193, 198, 139 S.W.2d 30, 32 (1940) (“It will 
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may be one of a very short list of options that allow predictable management 
of the devolution of nonprobate transfers. 
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